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Abstract
With global value chains interlocking today’s economies, what is the impact of dip-
lomatic tensions on international trade? We exploit variation in monthly data on 
imports, a measure of imported input use in the domestic economy, and the inci-
dence of bilateral diplomatic tensions to show that their impact on trade is heteroge-
neous across countries and industries. Trade in industries that are crucial for domes-
tic production is more sensitive to political tensions. We expose the underlying 
mechanism in a simple framework before testing it in reduced form.
Keywords Diplomatic tensions · Political relations · Trade
“Multinationals are very nervous now, and they should be. [...] In the past, only 
some sectors—mining, oil and gas, commodity companies—had to worry about 
geopolitics. Now companies that make fizzy drinks or handbags or chocolate are 
finding their supply chains, their markets, their operations completely blown apart 
by geopolitical risks and unfavorable treatment.”
— Mark Leonard, co-founder of the European Council on Foreign Relations.1
Formerly circulated under the title “Politics of Global Value Chains”.
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1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a resurgence of political tensions between countries. While 
occasions when states threaten the use of military force are rare, diplomatic tensions 
are frequent. Flare-ups of disagreement or personal hostility between the leaders of 
two countries increases uncertainty of the future of bilateral political relations. At 
the same time, the proliferation of international supply chains has made the domes-
tic production of goods increasingly dependent on inputs from foreign sources. By 
expanding their sourcing portfolio to foreign suppliers, firms and by extension entire 
economies are more prone to the trade effects of adverse bilateral political shocks.
The political fall-out of the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal is a case in 
point. In early March 2018 the former Russian spy and his daughter were poisoned 
with a military-grade nerve agent of a type developed by Russia.2 The British Prime 
Minister made a statement in parliament, seeking an explanation from Russia.3 By 
March 14, the UK had expelled 23 Russian diplomats who were identified as unde-
clared intelligence officers and had suspended all planned high-level contact. On 
March 17, Russia summoned the United Kingdom’s ambassador to Russia; 33 mem-
bers of the diplomatic staff in Moscow were declared persona non grata, and were 
expelled from Russia within a week. The UK then closed its consulate in St. Peters-
burg, and the British Council office in Moscow.4
Interestingly, as Fig. 1 shows, the incident may also have had a noticeable and 
peculiar impact on bilateral trade between the two countries. Figure 1a contrasts the 
UK’s (smoothed) imports from Russia against the imports by other European coun-
tries from Russia. The former shows a marked drop in total imports precisely around 
the time of the incident. Other European countries did not register such a decline. 
However, the impact on UK imports appears to have been heterogeneous across dif-
ferent types of goods, as depicted by Fig.  1b. Intermediate goods—those that are 
intended for use in the production of other goods in the UK—such as metals and 
mineral products, appear to have taken a much more severe hit than did final prod-
ucts, such as foodstuffs or machinery.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of bilateral diplomatic relations 
on trade; we focus on why some sectors may be more sensitive than are others. We 
show in a stylized theoretical framework why certain industries may be more prone 
to disruption as a result of diplomatic tensions than are others, and we test the main 
hypothesis empirically.
The model assumes a two-sector and many-countries world, where a “diplomatic 
shock” may affect the sourcing decision of a representative firm for imported inputs. 
2 See e.g. https ://www.thegu ardia n.com/uk-news/2018/mar/07/russi an-spy-polic e-appea l-for-witne sses-
as-cobra -meeti ng-takes -place .
3 See https ://www.thegu ardia n.com/uk-news/2018/mar/12/russi a-highl y-likel y-to-be-behin d-poiso ning-
of-spy-says-there sa-may.
4 Over the course of 2018 the number of diplomats who were expelled from either side—in addition 
to those from a number of UK-allied countries—rose to an astonishing 342 (https ://www.aljaz eera.com/
indep th/inter activ e/2018/04/skrip al-case-diplo matic -expul sions -numbe rs-18040 21212 17839 .html. This 
underlines the severity of this particular diplomatic incident.
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The model shows that this effect may be heterogeneous across sectors, even when 
the shock is homogeneous. The key determinant of the heterogeneity is the degree 
to which the imported input is used directly and indirectly in the production process, 
and whether viable alternative sourcing countries exist. The model thus captures 
an important feature of today’s global economy: Goods that are produced in one 
country are often used as an input in another country. Disruptions to trade—whether 
through an increase in tariffs or political tensions—thus do not only affect consum-
ers directly, but also affect production of down-stream products.
We test the proposed mechanism in reduced form: We first construct a measure 
of the intensity of imported input use that follows from the model; we characterise 
how important certain imports are for certain countries. We then exploit variation 
in monthly data on imports and the incidence of bilateral diplomatic events. We use 
a novel dataset that records diplomatic events that are found in press releases that 
were collected from the websites of the foreign ministries of five politically and eco-
nomically important countries: the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan, and 
Russia.
We contribute to the literature that studies the effect of diplomatic relations 
on trade. Measuring diplomatic relations and their evolution over time is chal-
lenging. Some authors have used direct measures of an increase in political 
ties, such as the presence of embassies (Rose 2007) or official visits of heads 
of state (Nitsch 2007). Others measure changes in political relations more indi-
rectly: They use specific events such as the Dalai Lama’s visits to foreign coun-
tries (Fuchs and Klann 2013; Lin et  al. 2019) or boycott campaigns (Heilmann 
2016); voting similarities between countries at the UN General Assembly (Mitya-
kov et al. 2013); or asylum policies (Cucu and Panon 2020). We add to previous 
studies by emphasizing the country-industry-specific heterogeneity of the impact, 
due to global value chains’ shaping countries’ dependence in imported inputs. We 
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Fig. 1  Impact of diplomatic tensions on UK–Russia trade
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furthermore propose a novel measure that clearly identifies the beginning of dip-
lomatic tensions with an official recorded action taken by a government.
The literature provides strong evidence that political relations affect trade. 
However, the underlying mechanism depends on the context: Heilmann (2016) 
shows that the effect on trade is driven mainly by changes in the attitudes of con-
sumers; while in Fuchs and Klann (2013) the aggregate effect is driven by indus-
tries for which negotiations are carried out during the course of high-ranking 
governmental trade negotiations.
Most similar to our paper is the work by Michaels and Zhi (2010), who study 
the impact of the French opposition to the Iraq war in 2003 on bilateral flows 
between the US and France. They find evidence that French exports to the US 
dropped significantly—especially for intermediate inputs. Their finding is con-
sistent with a change in managers’ attitudes towards France. Acknowledging the 
importance of intermediate inputs, we show in a simple framework that trade in 
inputs that are used intensively directly and indirectly by the importing econ-
omy are more prone to disruption by diplomatic tensions than is trade in other 
products.
Our paper also addresses the growing strand of the literature that stresses the role 
of uncertainty and changing expectations in shaping economic outcomes. One prom-
inent example is the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union, which 
affected important economic outcomes: stock market prices (Breinlich et al. 2018; 
Davies and Studnicka 2018); GDP (Born et al. 2019); and trade flows (Crowley et al. 
2018). In another context, in relation to the sanctions against the Russian Federa-
tion in response to the events in eastern Ukraine and Crimea in 2014, Crozet and 
Hinz (2020) show that even products that were not directly targeted by any measure 
experienced a decline in exports to Russia. They show that those products that rely 
on trade finance instruments—e.g., letter-of-credit financing of a transaction—fared 
worse than other products.
Finally, the paper is related to a resurgence of interest in the evaluation of trade 
policy changes and disruptions to trade in a time of tightly-connected economies 
through global value chains. Two recent papers—Fajgelbaum et al. (2019) and Amiti 
et al. (2019)—study the impact of tariffs that were imposed by the Trump adminis-
tration against China; the papers rely on state-of-the-art models that exhibit domes-
tic and international input–output linkages. In a project that re-evaluates the results 
by Ossa (2014) and Felbermayr et  al. (2013), who find surprisingly optimal high 
tariffs, Romalis et al. (2019) investigate optimal trade subsidies and tariffs in a world 
that is characterized by global value chains; they find—on average—much lower 
and, importantly, much more heterogeneous optimal trade policies across countries 
and industries. While our model sketches a more stylized view of the global econ-
omy, it shares this feature of domestic and international input–output linkages while 
investigating the impact of bilateral policies that impact trade.
The paper is structured as follows: In Sect. 2 we sketch a simple framework that 
formalizes the mechanism, where those imported inputs that are used intensively 
directly and indirectly in an economy are more sensitive to political tensions, given 
that viable sourcing alternatives exist. We describe the data we use to test this mech-
anism in Sect.  3, while Sect.  4 lays out the empirical strategy. The econometric 
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results are discussed in Sect. 5, and robustness tests are discussed in Sect. 6. Sec-
tion 7 concludes.
2  A Simple Model
A simple stylized model can help in understanding why, in a world with global value 
chains, the impact of homogeneous bilateral political disruptions may be heteroge-
neous across industries.
Assume a world with a home country and a number of foreign countries. A rep-
resentative firm in the home country produces two goods, x and y, that are combined 
into an output bundle to be consumed by the representative consumer.5 For the pro-
duction of each, the firm uses labor, its own other good, and two imported inputs: 
m and n. These can be sourced from foreign countries at different prices, such that 
there is a ranking from the cheapest to the most expensive source for each input. 
Let 휀m and 휀n describe the price gap between the cheapest and the second-cheapest 
source.
The production for x and y is of a Cobb–Douglas type such that:
and the firm’s output bundle is given by
The corresponding prices of the imported inputs, pm and pn , include all costs associ-
ated with shipping, including costs for trade finance services, such as insurance that 
covers the failure of a timely delivery. For the purposes of the argument, assume 
that the firm sources m and n from the same foreign country initially, as this is the 
cheapest source available for both inputs. Then consider a negative shock to politi-
cal relations between the home country and this foreign country. Assume that this 
shock introduces or increases uncertainty about whether the input that is sourced 
from abroad actually arrives, which increases the price of insuring or financing a 
transaction, and hence translates into an increase in the price of m and n.6 Let 휁 
measure the difference between the price of inputs from this foreign country before 
and after the shock.
The firm aims at minimizing the effect of the shock on its output bundle, with two 
possible options for each input: 
(1)
x = l휆x
x
y훽x
x
m훾x
x
n훿x
x
and y = l
휆y
y x
훼y
y m
훾y
y n
훿y
y
where 휆x + 훽x + 훾x + 훿x = 휆y + 훼y + 훾y + 훿y = 1
(2)Y = x휂y1−휂 with 0 ≤ 휂 ≤ 1.
5 Equivalently, one could model the consumer to have a Cobb–Douglas utility function with shares 휂 and 
1 − 휂 for the two goods.
6 C.f. Crozet and Hinz (2020), who show that sanctions against the Russian Federation in the response 
to the events in eastern Ukraine and Crimea also affected those goods that were actually not directly tar-
geted in any way—likely through more expensive trade finance instruments.
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1. The price-increase leads to a reduction of imports from the foreign country;
2. The firm starts sourcing from another foreign country, subject to a switching cost 
𝜔 > 0.
Following Eqs. (1) and (2), we can express the benefits of switching suppliers for input 
m as follows:
and for input n accordingly. If the benefits outweigh the switching costs, the firm 
switches supplier; i.e., when
For a given 휔 and 휁 , the switch depends on: 
1. The sign of 휁 − 휀m : whether the price change is larger than the initial price gap;
2. The magnitude of the term (휂(훾x + 훽x훾y) + (1 − 휂)(훾y + 훼y훾x)) , i.e. the importance 
of this input in direct and indirect use in the production.
For 𝜁 − 𝜀m < 0 , the firm does not switch. If, however, the initial price gap is smaller 
than the price change, the importance of the input for output bundle determines whether 
a switch occurs. A high direct and indirect use of the input leads to a significant change 
in output bundle, which may be larger than the fixed costs for switching. Hence, even 
for the same shock 휁 and the same fixed costs of switching 휔 , imports of inputs m and n 
may differ in their response to the shock, due to differences in the initial price gap and 
their use in the firm’s production process.
The simple model displays one mechanism through which political shocks may have 
a heterogeneous effect on trade flows. In the real world, economies consist of many 
firms, which source many inputs from many suppliers. Yet, even when abstracting from 
these complexities, the following hypothesis should hold: A negative shock to bilateral 
political relations leads to a general decrease in trade flows. The response should be 
larger for products in markets with a small price gap and a high imported input use. In 
other words, a country’s involvement in global value chains thus exposes it to greater 
dependence on upstream inputs, if alternative sourcing partners are rare.
|
|
|
|
휕 log(Y)
휕pm
|
|
|
|switch
−
|
|
|
|
휕 log(Y)
휕pm
|
|
|
|switch
= (휁 − 휀m)
1
pm
(휂(훾x + 훽x훾y) + (1 − 휂)(훾y + 훼y훾x))
(𝜁 − 𝜀m)
1
pm
(𝜂(𝛾x + 𝛽x𝛾y) + (1 − 𝜂)(𝛾y + 𝛼y𝛾x)) > 𝜔
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3  Data
We test the hypothesis with the use of the incidence of diplomatic events as a proxy 
for negative shocks to bilateral diplomatic relations, in combination with industry-
level data on monthly bilateral trade and input–output tables to capture the direct 
and indirect use of imported inputs.
3.1  Diplomatic Events
As noted above, summoning or recalling high-level diplomats is used as a diplo-
matic instrument to signal discontent and put pressure on a foreign government. 
We collected data on the actions taken by the United Kingdom, Germany, France, 
Japan, and the Russian Federation; all are lead actors in the political arena as well 
as in trade, combined accounting for 25% of world imports.7 The five countries have 
repeatedly made use of the summoning or recalling of diplomats as an instrument of 
foreign policy. We have collected information on these events over the time period 
from 2010 until 2014 from official press releases that are available on the website 
of each Ministry of Foreign Affairs;8 we use keyword searches such as “ambassa-
dor summoned”, “ambassador recalled”, “withdrawal of diplomatic staff”, “embassy 
closure”.9
3.2  Trade Flows
We use data on monthly trade flows from UN Comtrade (United Nations Statistics 
Division 2015). We extract data on the imports of the five countries vis-à-vis the rest 
of the world—241 countries and territories—from January 2010 to December 2014 
(60 months). We aggregate the data into 16 manufacturing sectors as defined in 
WIOD to match the level of aggregation of our import use measure that we describe 
below.
7 Three of the five countries—France, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation—are permanent 
members of the UN Security Council. Notably absent from the list of countries are the United States and 
China, whose foreign policy clearly shapes global events and likely influences trade flows. Unfortunately, 
however, the US State Department does not make public instances in which these instruments of diplo-
macy are used. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs does publish press releases, but it is technically 
difficult to retrieve them en masse, as the website does not allow searches of its archive.
8 “Appendix A.1” lists the direct weblinks to the different websites.
9 A diplomat may be summoned or recalled for different reasons, as some examples of events show: In 
November 2010, Russia summoned the Canadian ambassador over new visa requirements for Russian 
nationals; in February 2011, France summoned the Mexican ambassador with regard to the situation of 
the French-national Florence Cassez; in July 2012, Japan summoned the Chinese ambassador to protest 
against the entry of patrol ships into disputed territorial waters; in March 2013, Germany summoned the 
Chinese ambassador to condemn an attack on a German journalist; in June 2014, the British Foreign 
Office summoned the Egyptian ambassador following an Egyptian court’s guilty verdicts against Egyp-
tian and international journalists. More details on these cases and a complete list of events can be found 
in “Appendix A.2”.
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3.3  Imported Input Use
The simple model in Sect.  2 postulates that one key determinant of the response 
to the shock is the country’s involvement in global value chains, through its direct 
and indirect use of imported inputs. The term (휂(훾x + 훽x훾y) + (1 − 휂)(훾y + 훼y훾x)) can 
easily be translated into a multi-product setting, including domestic production of 
inputs, as
where Ad,imp is the matrix of the values of imported inputs by sector in country d and 
Ad,dom the matrix of the values of domestic inputs by sector. Fd is the vector of final 
consumption shares. Each element of the vector IIUd denotes the required value of 
a foreign input for a 1-unit value of final consumption in the domestic economy for 
a given sector k. The higher is the necessary imported value, the more important is 
the input for the country’s economy. We compute the measure for the five countries 
of interest with the use of the global input–output table for the year 2008 from the 
World Input Output Database (Timmer et  al. 2015).10 The table covers 34 sectors 
that encompass both manufacturing and services.
(3)IIUd = Ad,imp(I − Ad,dom)−1Fd
(b)(a)
Fig. 2  Histogram and top 10 imported input use per 1000 USD GDP for UK
10 Relying on data from 2008 ensures the exogeneity of the input coefficients for the event study.
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Figure 2 shows the histogram of all the 34 sectors and the ranking of the 10 most 
important imported inputs sectors for the United Kingdom.11 The ranking and mag-
nitude are sensible, with petroleum and metals ranking first and third in terms of 
imported input use. Farther down-stream goods—such as food products and machin-
ery—are ranked eighth and below. Figure 1b in the introduction is consistent with 
such a ranking, where the former two accounted for the bulk of the decrease in UK 
imports from Russia in the aftermath of the Skripal poisoning, whereas the latter 
two saw little impact.
4  Empirical Strategy
Our aim is to analyze how imports respond to a negative shock to diplomatic rela-
tions, and test whether imports in sectors with a high import input use and a small 
price gap decrease relatively more than imports in other sectors. Our dependent var-
iable is hence (the logarithm) of monthly imports by industry and source country. 
The treatment is an indicator for the occurrence of a diplomatic incident, coded as 
described above. We take import flows from other countries that are never treated as 
the control group.12
This obviously would be a problematic assumption if we were interested in only 
the estimated coefficient of this treatment. Import flows could be redirected from the 
treated source country to another source country from the control group and thus 
bias upwards the estimated coefficient. However, we are primarily interested in the 
interaction of the treatment with country-industry and industry-specific variables, 
which should not be affected.
The equation we estimate is
We interact the Treatment variable with a proxy for the industry-specific price gap, 
Concentrationk , and the country-industry-specific imported input use measure, 
IIUdk . To measure the price gap on the sourcing market we compute a Herfindahl 
(4)
log(Xodkt) = 훿0 ⋅ Treatmentodt
+ 훿1 ⋅ Treatmentodt × log(IIUdk)
+ 훿2 ⋅ Treatmentodt × Concentrationk
+ 훿3 ⋅ Treatmentodt × log(IIUdk) × Concentrationk
+ 횪 + 휖odkt
12 As there is a small number of country pairs that do not entertain bilateral diplomatic representations, 
e.g. North Korea and France do not have official diplomatic relations, we consider only country pairs that 
do have embassies or consulates in each other’s country in the analysis.
11 We also compute the measure for the most detailed openly available input–output table, for the United 
States from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, with data on 389 industries, and compare it with the 
respective measure that is computed with the use of WIOD data. The results are displayed in Table 4 in 
“Appendix B”. The direct comparison shows consistent figures by ranking and magnitude across these 
different levels of aggregation. Unfortunately, input–output tables of this great detail are a rarity for other 
countries.
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index of total exports across source countries with trade data for 2010. The under-
lying assumption is that the greater the Herfindahl index, the lower is the level of 
competition, and thus the higher is the price gap in this industry. We normalize the 
imported input use measure by the respective country’s average imported input use 
and take the logarithm. Thus, the interpretation of the coefficients is straightforward, 
as the benchmark is an industry with an infinitely small price gap and the average 
imported input use of the importer.
We control for unobservable characteristics with the use of different sets of time, 
importing country, source country, and industry fixed effects, which are denoted by 
the vector 횪 . More specifically, in a different specification we control for exporter-
date and importer-date-specific, or even exporter-industry-date and importer-indus-
try-date-specific characteristics, such as demand and supply shocks. Importantly, 
these sets of fixed effects also address concerns that diplomatic incidents may reflect 
broader political changes in the countries in question, which would affect all eco-
nomic activity and confound the effect of bilateral diplomatic relations. We also 
include bilateral directed country-pair-industry, and country-pair-industry-month 
fixed effects that capture all time-invariant trade barriers, and in the latter case also 
seasonal effects. Through these fixed effects the coefficients hence reflect a com-
parison to a state of “normal” bilateral relations, which take into account bilateral 
historical episodes, such as previous colonial ties.
The coefficient on the Treatment variable—훿0—is the average effect for the 
benchmark: a small price gap and the average imported input use of the importer, 
which we expect to have a negative sign. The main test of our prediction comes 
from the interaction between Treatment × log(IIU)dk . In our simple framework, we 
show that the effect should be magnified by the degree of imported input use, given 
a small price gap. The coefficient of the interaction between Treatment × log(IIU)dk
—훿1—is therefore expected to be negative.
The remaining interaction terms are necessary for the test, but the interpreta-
tion of their coefficients—훿2 and 훿3—is not explicitly guided by the framework. We 
would, however, expect positive coefficients. In principle, lower concentration—
higher price gaps—should yield a lower response of import flows and a more muted 
influence for those industries with high imported input use.
5  Results
The results from estimating Eq.  (4) are presented in Table 1. There are a total 
of 40 events. For those country pairs for which we observe several events over 
the period, we use the date of the first one to construct the treatment variable.13 
The two main coefficients of interest—훿0 and 훿1—are negative and very stable 
across specifications with different sets of fixed effects 횪 . The effects are in line 
with the hypothesis from the framework in Sect. 2. The overall effect of political 
tensions on trade is negative, and more pronounced for important inputs to the 
13 See “Appendix A.2” for the full list of events.
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domestic economy. An economy’s dependence on foreign upstream production 
makes it vulnerable to adverse bilateral shocks with the supplying country.
In column (1) we include importing country × date, sourcing country × date, 
and country pair × industry fixed effects to control for unobserved characteris-
tics. In columns (2) and (3) we are even more restrictive and augment the coun-
try × date fixed effects by an industry, and calendar month dimension. While this 
leaves very little variation in the data, the estimated coefficients persist.
The estimates of 훿0 range between − 0.074 and − 0.083, which translates into 
an average decrease in imports in reaction to a shock to political relations for 
the reference group in the preferred specification (1) of exp(−0.083) − 1 = −8% . 
Although, as described above, the estimates have to be taken with caution, the 
magnitude of the effects mirrors very well the results from the related literature. 
Michaels and Zhi (2010) find an 8% drop in bilateral trade between France and 
the US in response to the Iraq war, while Nitsch (2007) reports an increase of 
8–10% in exports after the visit of a head of state.
The estimates of 훿1 range between − 0.051 and − 0.069, which corresponds 
to an additional exp(−0.069) − 1 = −6.7% decrease in imports for a sector with 
import use twice as high as the average for the preferred specification.
The coefficients 훿2 and 훿3 both have positive coefficients, which confirms 
the intuition that lower concentration in an industry yields a lower response of 
import flows, and a smaller role for imported input use.
Table 1  Event study—political shock and heterogeneous effect
Robust standard errors: * p < 0.1 ; **p < 0.05 ; ***p < 0.01
Dependent variable
log(imports)
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment − 0.083*** − 0.074** − 0.083**
(0.026) (0.033) (0.035)
Treatment × log(IIU) − 0.069*** − 0.051* − 0.061**
(0.021) (0.028) (0.031)
Treatment × concentration 0.699** 0.568 0.672
(0.301) (0.407) (0.446)
Treatment × concentration × log(IIU) 0.571*** 0.426* 0.486**
(0.168) (0.218) (0.243)
Fixed effects ctry-dt, ctry-ind-dt, ctry-ind-dt,
pair-ind pair-ind pair-ind-mo
Observations 410,303 410,303 410,303
R2 0.913 0.951 0.964
Adjusted  R2 0.909 0.925 0.922
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6  Robustness Tests
We conduct a series of robustness tests to validate the findings against a number of 
potential concerns that are related to the sample or other confounding variables.
In Table 2 columns (1)–(3) we re-estimate Eq. (4) on three subsamples. One con-
cern is that the coefficients from our benchmark estimation are driven by outliers: 
Small economies that for reasons other than bilateral diplomatic relations decrease 
their exports to the five countries of interest after being “treated” by one of the 
events described above. In column (1) we report the coefficients when selecting only 
the 50 largest economies out of the 241 countries that are present in the data as 
sourcing countries. The coefficients on the terms of interest retain the same sign and 
stay within a standard error of the baseline results in Table 1, despite the number of 
observations being cut by 42%.
A further concern could be that the results are driven by the events that occurred 
in connection with the so-called Arab spring, which is in the time window of the 
data that we use. The summoning of the respective ambassadors was relatively 
Table 2  Robustness test—country samples and industry-specific measures
*p < 0.1 ; **p < 0.05 ; ***p < 0.01
Dependent variable
log(imports)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment − 0.082*** − 0.055** − 0.085*** − 0.119** − 0.098**
(0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.061) (0.040)
Treatment × log(IIU) − 0.079*** − 0.060*** − 0.042* − 0.072*** − 0.071***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021)
Treatment × concentration 0.624* 0.452 0.675** 0.697** 0.680**
(0.331) (0.343) (0.314) (0.302) (0.304)
Treatment × concentra-
tion × log(IIU)
0.563*** 0.382** 0.364** 0.587*** 0.573***
(0.183) (0.182) (0.177) (0.169) (0.168)
Treatment × labor intensity 0.061
(0.088)
Treatment × skill intensity 0.084
(0.155)
Fixed effects ctry-dt, ctry-dt, ctry-dt, ctry-dt, ctry-dt,
Pair-ind Pair-ind Pair-ind Pair-ind Pair-ind
Sample Top 50 w/o Arab league w/o Russia All All
Observations 237,463 371,827 359,753 410,303 410,303
R2 0.929 0.918 0.914 0.913 0.913
Adjusted  R2 0.927 0.914 0.910 0.908 0.908
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common.14 The events coincided with security crises in these countries that could 
equally cause a sharp decline in imports, driving the reported results. We therefore 
re-ran the estimation of Eq. (4) on only non-Arab league countries. We find that the 
concern is not merited: The coefficients in column (2) remain very similar.
Another concern could be on the side of the importing country, as we were able 
to collect data only on diplomatic events from five major geopolitical players. One 
of the countries—Russia—could be of particular concern, as it could be argued that 
the country conducts its foreign policy structurally differently from Western coun-
tries and Japan. We therefore re-ran the estimation without events that involved the 
Russian Federation. Column (3) shows that this concern is also not merited.
A different concern involves the mechanism itself: The results could be driven by 
industry-specific factors that are not captured by the employed fixed effects. It could 
be that certain industries—which are labor or skill-intensive—react differently to a 
sudden change in bilateral diplomatic relations than do others. We test this assertion 
by estimating Eq.  (4) with an additional interaction of indicators that are derived 
from the WIOD dataset on the labor and skill-intensity of sectors. Columns (4) and 
(5) in Table 2 show again that these concerns are not merited. Neither the interaction 
with labor-intensity, nor the interaction with skill-intensity are significant, and the 
coefficients of interest retain the same sign and stay within a standard error of the 
results of the benchmark specification that were reported in Table 1.
7  Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature that studies the impact of diplomatic relations 
on trade in showing that the impact is heterogeneous across industries, owing to the 
entanglement of industries in global value chains.
Specifically, we show that imports of products that are used as inputs in a domes-
tic economy intensively are more sensitive to negative diplomatic shocks than are 
other imports. We develop a simple theoretical framework that exhibits the mech-
anism and then test the mechanism empirically in reduced-form. We estimate the 
effect of sudden shocks to diplomatic relations on the import flows of five economi-
cally and politically important countries with the use of a novel dataset on diplo-
matic incidents: The summoning and recalling of an ambassador or other high-level 
diplomats. The econometric results provide evidence for the mechanism exhibited 
by the model. Diplomatic relations have a heterogeneous impact on imported inputs, 
driven by the importing country’s direct and indirect use of imported input, control-
ling for the ease of switching sourcing partners.
The theoretical framework depicts a stylized version of the world economy with 
domestic and international input–output linkages. While the simplicity is attrac-
tive to highlight the mechanism at play, there are obvious simplifications that could 
be addressed in more involved models. In particular: One could imagine a richer 
characterization of the inner workings of the economy and explicitly model firms’ 
14 See “Appendix A.2” for the list of events.
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decisions in a political economy framework. As the main point is to establish the 
basic mechanism at play; however, this is beyond the scope of the current project.
Looking at the current state of the world of bilateral political relations and the 
status quo of research on the nexus of politics, trade, and global value chains, we see 
ample room for further research. As hinted at above, future work could investigate 
the role of firms, taking cues from the literature on the political economy of protec-
tionism and recent work on the impact of tariffs in a world that is characterized by 
global value chains. Furthermore, we do wonder about the underlying mechanisms 
that may affect the exporting side, as is briefly mentioned in current research on 
sanctions. We refer these intriguing questions to future research.
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Appendix A: Press Releases from Ministries of Foreign Affairs
A.1 Links to Websites of Foreign Ministries
• France: http://www.diplo matie .gouv.fr/en/
• Germany: http://www.auswa ertig es-amt.de/
• Japan: http://www.mofa.go.jp
• Russian Federation: http://www.mid.ru/
• United Kingdom: http://www.gov.uk/gover nment /organ isati ons/forei gn-commo 
nweal th-offic e
A.2 List of Events
See Table 3.
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Appendix B: Imported Input Use with Detailed Input Output Data
See Table 4.
Table 4  Top 20 US industries by imported input use with BEA (top) and WIOD data (bottom) per $1000 
GDP)
BEA industry Imported input use
1 Oil and gas extraction 13.12
2 Petroleum refineries 4.14
3 Insurance carriers 3.31
4 Iron and steel mills and ferroalloy manufacturing 1.73
5 Other motor vehicle parts manufacturing 1.62
6 Computer terminals and other computer peripheral equipment manufacturing 1.36
7 Pharmaceutical preparation manufacturing 1.26
8 Management consulting services 1.21
9 Other basic organic chemical manufacturing 1.19
10 Motor vehicle gasoline engine and engine parts manufacturing 1.17
11 Semiconductor and related device manufacturing 0.84
12 Other electronic component manufacturing 0.81
13 Motor vehicle transmission and power train parts manufacturing 0.81
14 Other plastics product manufacturing 0.72
15 Fishing, hunting and trapping 0.70
16 Telephone apparatus manufacturing 0.69
17 Plastics material and resin manufacturing 0.67
18 Primary smelting and refining of nonferrous metal (except copper and alu-
minum)
0.66
19 Other engine equipment manufacturing 0.64
20 Broadcast and wireless communications equipment 0.63
WIOD industry Imported input use
1 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 115.50
2 Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security 55.49
3 Transport Equipment 50.20
4 Renting of M&Eq and Other Business Activities 34.62
5 Financial Intermediation 34.11
6 Chemicals and Chemical Products 33.40
7 Construction 28.59
8 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 28.00
9 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 25.33
10 Electrical and Optical Equipment 22.66
11 Health and Social Work 22.26
12 Mining and Quarrying 19.20
13 Machinery, Nec 17.69
14 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 16.03
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Table 4  (continued)
WIOD industry Imported input use
15 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and 
Motorcycles
15.57
16 Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of Household 
Goods
14.64
17 Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and Publishing 14.52
18 Other Community, Social and Personal Services 13.52
19 Hotels and Restaurants 13.27
20 Real Estate Activities 11.81
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